.Self-exclusion is a voluntary application to exclude oneself from the casinos in Singapore. Data prior to 2018 taken from previous reports. A Singapore Government Agency Website. Exclusion E-Services. National Council On Problem Gambling. Report Vulnerability. About Us; The Team; Advertise with Us.
by Foo Cheow Ming
The casinos have been here in Singapore for 5 years now. This is therefore an appropriate time to have a quick review of the laws governing casinos and gaming in Singapore where it concerns the average gamer-citizen.
We will – of course – not discuss such laws as concern the casino operators, as they would be well advised by their own professional legal advisors of the complex thicket of laws and licensing conditions which govern casino operators. What we shall instead discuss here are some of the legalities involved in gaming and attendances at casino which we should all be aware of, even as citizens and gamers.
Who can enter the casino?
- Citizens and PRs of Singapore may only have the right of entry into a casino upon paying $100 per every 24 hours. Note – if you opt to remain for one single minute beyond the first 24 hours, another $100 would become payable. Non-payment of such a levy is punishable by a fine up to S$1,000.
- Persons below the age of 21 may not enter any casino.
- If anyone uses the ID of another person to enter the casino, that person may be charged for cheating by impersonation, as well as charged for being in possession of another person's identification documents.
- Both the casino as well as the Casino Regulatory Authority may issue an exclusion order prohibiting any specific individual from entering the casino. An exclusion order can be the result of self-exclusion, exclusion by family members, or automatic exclusion by law (e.g. for undischarged bankrupts). Anyone who is the subject matter of an exclusion order may not enter the casino. Doing so would be an offence, and his winnings forfeited. He would also have committed an offence attracting a fine not exceeding $10,000 or jail up to 12 months or to both.
Don't bring anything that is used to cheat
Possession of anything used for cheating (cards, dice or coins that have been marked, loaded or otherwise tampered with), or any equipment, device or thing that permits or facilitates cheating or stealing, or which would interfere with the operation of gaming equipment, would attract very heavy penalties involving fine up to $150,000 or jail up to 7 years or to both. You should note that ‘'use'' of such equipment need not be proved; it is an offence to even possess such things within the casino. This rule covers not just tampered cards, dice and coins, but arguably also miniaturized or concealed computer equipment to calculate odds in card games such as poker, bridge or blackjack.
Don't bring chips out of the casino
Most interestingly, it is even an offence to possess chips (above a certain amount) except within the premises of a casino. This means that the law does not permit you to bring out of the casino the chips you bought. It is an offence to do so, and this offence is punishable very severely by a fine up to $150,000 or jail up to 5 years or to both.
One wonders why this is so: why can't you take out of the casino genuine chips which you have paid with your own money? If you paid for the chips, are they not yours, for you to bring wherever you want to?
It is known that in some of the more advanced casinos overseas, the casino operators have installed integrated circuit chips or smartchips into every gaming chip. The smartchips can be read remotely by radio frequency detectors (like those found in electronic door access cards used in most offices nowadays) installed on game tables. In those casinos employing this technology, the specially encrypted codes have three functions:
- To ensure authenticity and prevent forged chips from being presented for cash (chips may be exchanged for their equivalent value in cash and are effectively bearer instruments);
- The presence of the specially encrypted information within such chips ensure that every single chip is individually serial-numbered and identified, so as to enable radio frequency detecting sensors to calculate and record conclusively the correct odds and returns of each bet by each gamer;
- Thirdly and perhaps most significantly, the presence of the specially encrypted information within such chip enable radio frequency detecting sensors to detect ‘'post-bettings'' (i.e. the surreptitious shifting of chips by cheaters after bets are closed).
Thus, it makes sense that the casino operator would not permit anyone to take genuine chips out of its premises where the information encoded on such chips may then be analyzed, decrypted and then duplicated. For this reason, duplication of genuine chips is therefore punished as if legal tender of the land is being forged.
Informers are protected
Most interestingly, the identity of an informer who has given information with respect to a casino offence (e.g. if you inform against someone who is cheating) is protected against discovery in both civil and criminal proceedings. This degree of protection is only accorded to informers under the Prevention of Corruption Act and drug cases. The identity of the informer is not protected by confidentiality even in much more serious offences such as terrorism, treason, murder, assisting the enemy etc.
Lastly, for anyone who wishes to contravene or bend or cheat any of the rules in a casino, just be aware that your average modern casino has the highest number of camera per square foot outside the offices of CIA, MI6 or the KGB (now known as FSB)! Several cameras capture different and overlapping angles of every spot within the gaming hall. Cameras may be visible, or concealed, and they can operate on visible light, infra-red or ultra-violet frequencies (for detecting concealed devices). Face and voice recognition computer software is now widely utilized to scan, pick up and track specific faces, speech or even clothing styles from the teeming thousands that throng a casino daily. When coupled with smartchip-embedded gambling chips and radio frequency detecting sensors, this means that a punter's every physical movement and gaming bet would be logged. Sensors guard against removal of chips from the casino; sensors also detect chips being brought into the casino (to prevent forged chips from being brought in to be exchanged for cash).
The author Foo Cheow Ming is an experienced criminal law practitioner. He is a director at Templars Law LLC.
Self-exclusion is one of the most widely used responsible gaming strategies. These programs allow individuals to literally 'exclude' themselves from a gaming venue as a way of dealing with problematic gambling behavior. Scientific research on the safety and effectiveness of self-exclusion is just now catching up to the establishment of such programs, which began more than a decade ago.
The NCRG's Aug. 16 webinar, 'Regulating Interventions for Disordered Gambling: What New Research Says about the Safety, Effectiveness and Logistics of Self-Exclusion Programs,' will feature research by Robert Ladouceur, Ph.D., C.A.S., professor of psychology, Laval University, Quebec. (Click here for more details or to register for this free, one-hour program.) This month's Issues & Insights highlights selected peer-reviewed studies in this emerging area of research.
Self-exclusion programs provide a way for a person to voluntarily ban him or herself from a casino as a way to deal with a gambling problem. These programs can be mandated by the government or voluntarily established by casinos and other gaming operators. For example, casinos that are members of the American Gaming Association, which represents commercial casinos in the United States, are required by the association's Code of Conduct to provide their guests with the option to self-exclude. Under most self-exclusion agreements, the individual risks trespassing charges if she or he attempts to return to the casino and forfeits any winnings. The casino agrees to remove the self-excluded person from its direct mail lists, and many programs require a lifetime ban. However, some governments and casinos are experimenting with shorter bans because clinicians and researchers have expressed concerns that a lifetime ban may prevent people from enrolling.
Researchers are interested in what motivates an individual to enroll in a self-exclusion program because the act of enrollment represents treatment-seeking behavior. Since only a fraction of the population with a gambling problem seeks external assistance, understanding why gamblers choose to enter a self-exclusion program will help inform treatment strategies for disordered gambling. A 2010 study, 'Motivators for resolving or seeking help for gambling problems: A review of the empirical literature,' found that self-excluders were motivated by a weighing of the pros and cons of gambling and the desire to regain control over their gambling as well as concern about the impact on relationships and financial difficulties (Suurvali, Hodgins, & Cunningham).
The Missouri Gaming Commission, which created the Missouri Voluntary Exclusion Program (MVEP) in 1995, has made its data available to researchers, resulting in several publications. For example, researchers analyzed the Missouri enrollment data from the perspectives of age and gender (Nower & Blaszczynski, 2006, 2008). In 'Characteristics of problem gamblers 56 years of age or older: A statewide study of casino self-excluders,' they reported that older adult self-excluders typically began gambling in midlife, experienced gambling problems around age 60, reported preferences for nonstrategic forms of gambling (e.g., slot machines) and identified fear of suicide as the primary reason for enrolling in the MVEP (Nower & Blaszczynski, 2008). In another study of the MVEP, 'Characteristics and gender differences among self-excluded casino problem gamblers: Missouri data,' Nower and Blaszczynski observed that female self-excluders were more likely than males to be African American, older at time of application, and either retired, unemployed or otherwise outside the traditional workforce (2006). In addition, female self-excluders were more likely to report a later age of gambling onset, a shorter period between onset and self-exclusion, a preference for non-strategic forms of gambling and prior bankruptcy.
The Harvard Medical School faculty at the Division on Addictions, Cambridge Health Alliance, conducted a two-phase research project on the MVEP. As reported in 'Missouri casino self-excluders: Distributions across time and space,' a geographic and time-based analysis of the 6,599 people who applied to exclude themselves from Missouri casinos between 1996 and 2004 demonstrated that the epicenters of disordered gambling were the Western region around Kansas City and the Eastern region around St. Louis (LaBrie, Nelson, LaPlante, Peller, Caro, & Shaffer, 2007). The authors observed that the annual number of self-exclusion enrollments increased during the first few years of the MVEP before leveling off during the later years, suggesting a process of adaptation to the presence of casinos in Missouri.
The second phase of the Harvard study, as reported in the article, 'One decade of self exclusion: Missouri casino self-excluders four to ten years after enrollment,' focused on the effectiveness of the MVEP by assessing the experiences of a sample of Missouri self-excluders for as long as 10 years after their initial enrollment in the program (Nelson, Kleschinsky, LaBrie, Kaplan, & Shaffer, 2010). According to this study, most of the self-excluders had positive experiences with MVEP and reduced their gambling and gambling problems after enrollment. However, half of the 15.9 percent of the self-excluders succeeded in trespassing at Missouri casinos after enrollment, indicating that the benefit of MVEP was attributable more to the act of enrollment than enforcement.
Dr. Robert Ladouceur and his colleagues at Laval University also have conducted extensive research on the effectiveness of self-exclusion. Their studies of a self-exclusion program in a Quebec casino demonstrated the promise of this approach for helping individuals reduce problem gambling behaviors (Ladouceur, Jacques, Giroux, Ferland, & Leblond, 2000; Ladouceur, Sylvain & Gosselin, 2007). Their most recent study (Tremblay, Boutin, & Ladouceur, 2008) is the first to evaluate efforts to make self-exclusion a therapeutic program (e.g., providing counseling support to enrollees) rather than just a legal agreement about trespassing. The authors observed major improvements in the study sample between the initial and final evaluation in terms of the amount of time and money they spent gambling, the consequences of their gambling, scores on the criteria for diagnosing pathological gambling and levels of psychological distress.
Such findings appear to support the notion of self-exclusion as a gateway to treatment. In their 2007 publication, Blaszczynski, Ladouceur, and Nower argued for a unifying structure for self-exclusion programs as a gateway to treatment based on a system operated by independent educators. These educators would inform individuals of the purpose of self-exclusion, establish links and access to supplementary services and monitor and report the effectiveness of the overall program.
Although these studies reveal the promise of self-exclusion, all identify the need for larger sample sizes in future research to determine more definitively the effectiveness of self-exclusion as an intervention for disordered gambling.
Despite this interest in self-exclusion as a therapeutic program or harm reduction strategy, self-exclusion programs administered by governments are technically considered legal agreements with penalties for self-excluders who violate the terms of the contract. For example, self-excluders can be arrested for trespassing or fined if caught on the premises of a casino in many jurisdictions. Self-exclusion has raised questions among legal specialists about the responsibility and liability of the gaming operator. Self-excluders have initiated lawsuits in cases where the casino did not enforce the ban (Faregh, & Leth-Steensen, 2009; Czegledy, 2009). Questions such as, 'Who is responsible if a self-excluded person gains entry to a casino and goes bankrupt?' and 'Should casinos withhold winnings from self-excluded patrons?' have been posed in several court cases (Rhea, 2005). Some also have questioned whether self-exclusion agreements even meet the legal standards of an enforceable legal contract (Napolitano, 2003).
Although most of the peer-reviewed research on self-exclusion is focused on the U.S. and Canada, studies on this intervention have been conducted all over the world. Both peer-reviewed and 'grey' literature (publications that are not peer-reviewed, such as government reports) indicate that self-exclusion has been studied in Australia, New Zealand, Switzerland, South Africa and the United Kingdom (Breen, 2005; Townshend, 2007; Haefeli, 2005; O'Neil, Whetton, Dolman, et al., 2003; Collins, & Kelly, 2002; Jackson, & Thomas, 2005).
If you are interested in learning more about self-exclusion research, note that two upcoming educational programs will focus on translating several of the studies cited above for a non-scientific audience. First, Dr. Robert Ladouceur will present his findings from the self-exclusion program in Quebec during the NCRG Webinar, 'Regulating Interventions for Disordered Gambling: What New Research Says about the Safety, Effectiveness and Logistics of Self-Exclusion Programs.'This free, one-hour webinar will be held onAug. 16, 2010, at 2 p.m. (EDT), and also will feature Kevin Mullally, J.D., general counsel and director of government affairs at Gaming Laboratories International,and the developer of Missouri Voluntary Exclusion Program. Advance registration is required.
Second, the next volume of the NCRG's publication series, Increasing the Odds: A Series Dedicated to Understanding Gambling Disorders, focuses on research about self-exclusion, providing summaries of several of the articles cited above, written for a non-scientific audience. This free publication will be available in October 2010.
Blaszczynski, A., Ladouceur, R., & Nower, L. (2007). Self-exclusion: A proposed gateway to treatment model. International Gambling Studies, 7(1), 59-71.
Breen, H., Buultjens, J., & Hing, N. (2005). Evaluating implementation of a voluntary responsible gambling code in Queensland, Australia. International Journal of Mental Health & Addiction, 3(1), 15–25.
Collins, P. & Kelly, J. (2002). Problem Gambling and Self-Exclusion: A Report to the South African Responsible Gambling Trust. Gaming Law Review, 6(6), 517-531.
Revoke Casino Self Exclusion Singapore
Czegledy, P. (2009). The Legal Risk of Problem Gambling. Gaming Law Review and Economics, 13(3), 233-240.
Haefeli, J. (2005). Swiss experience with self-exclusion programs. Presented at the Niagara Falls Self Exclusion Panel, Niagara Falls. Retrieved from http://www.responsiblegambling.org/articles/jorg_hafeli_discovery_2005.pdf
Jackson, A., & Thomas, S. (2005). Clients' perspectives of, and experiences with, selected Australian problem gambling services. Journal of Gambling Issues, 14. Retrieved from http://jgi.camh.net/doi/full/10.4309/jgi.2005.14.7
LaBrie, R. A., Nelson, S. E., LaPlante, D. A., Peller, A. J., Caro, G., & Shaffer, H. J. (2007). Missouri casino self-excluders: distributions across time and space. Journal of Gambling Studies, 23(2), 231-243.
Ladouceur, R., Jacques, C., Giroux, I., Ferland, F., & Leblond, J. (2000). Analysis of a casino's self-exclusion program. Journal of Gambling Studies,16(4), 453-460.
Ladouceur, R., Sylvain, C., & Gosselin, P. (2007). Self-exclusion program: a longitudinal evaluation study. Journal of Gambling Studies, 23(1), 85-94.
Napolitano, F. (2003). The self-exclusion program: legal and clinical considerations. Journal of Gambling Studies,19(3), 303-315.
Nelson, S. E., Kleschinsky, J. H., LaBrie, R. A., Kaplan, S., & Shaffer, H. J. (2010). One decade of self exclusion: Missouri casino self-excluders four to ten years after enrollment. Journal of Gambling Studies,26(1), 129-144.
Nower, L., & Blaszczynski, A. (2006). Characteristics and gender differences among self-excluded casino problem gamblers: Missouri data. Journal of Gambling Studies,22(1), 81-99
Nower, L., & Blaszczynski, A. (2008). Characteristics of problem gamblers 56 years of age or older: a statewide study of casino self-excluders. Psychology and Aging, 23(3), 577-584.
Self-exclusion programs provide a way for a person to voluntarily ban him or herself from a casino as a way to deal with a gambling problem. These programs can be mandated by the government or voluntarily established by casinos and other gaming operators. For example, casinos that are members of the American Gaming Association, which represents commercial casinos in the United States, are required by the association's Code of Conduct to provide their guests with the option to self-exclude. Under most self-exclusion agreements, the individual risks trespassing charges if she or he attempts to return to the casino and forfeits any winnings. The casino agrees to remove the self-excluded person from its direct mail lists, and many programs require a lifetime ban. However, some governments and casinos are experimenting with shorter bans because clinicians and researchers have expressed concerns that a lifetime ban may prevent people from enrolling.
Researchers are interested in what motivates an individual to enroll in a self-exclusion program because the act of enrollment represents treatment-seeking behavior. Since only a fraction of the population with a gambling problem seeks external assistance, understanding why gamblers choose to enter a self-exclusion program will help inform treatment strategies for disordered gambling. A 2010 study, 'Motivators for resolving or seeking help for gambling problems: A review of the empirical literature,' found that self-excluders were motivated by a weighing of the pros and cons of gambling and the desire to regain control over their gambling as well as concern about the impact on relationships and financial difficulties (Suurvali, Hodgins, & Cunningham).
The Missouri Gaming Commission, which created the Missouri Voluntary Exclusion Program (MVEP) in 1995, has made its data available to researchers, resulting in several publications. For example, researchers analyzed the Missouri enrollment data from the perspectives of age and gender (Nower & Blaszczynski, 2006, 2008). In 'Characteristics of problem gamblers 56 years of age or older: A statewide study of casino self-excluders,' they reported that older adult self-excluders typically began gambling in midlife, experienced gambling problems around age 60, reported preferences for nonstrategic forms of gambling (e.g., slot machines) and identified fear of suicide as the primary reason for enrolling in the MVEP (Nower & Blaszczynski, 2008). In another study of the MVEP, 'Characteristics and gender differences among self-excluded casino problem gamblers: Missouri data,' Nower and Blaszczynski observed that female self-excluders were more likely than males to be African American, older at time of application, and either retired, unemployed or otherwise outside the traditional workforce (2006). In addition, female self-excluders were more likely to report a later age of gambling onset, a shorter period between onset and self-exclusion, a preference for non-strategic forms of gambling and prior bankruptcy.
The Harvard Medical School faculty at the Division on Addictions, Cambridge Health Alliance, conducted a two-phase research project on the MVEP. As reported in 'Missouri casino self-excluders: Distributions across time and space,' a geographic and time-based analysis of the 6,599 people who applied to exclude themselves from Missouri casinos between 1996 and 2004 demonstrated that the epicenters of disordered gambling were the Western region around Kansas City and the Eastern region around St. Louis (LaBrie, Nelson, LaPlante, Peller, Caro, & Shaffer, 2007). The authors observed that the annual number of self-exclusion enrollments increased during the first few years of the MVEP before leveling off during the later years, suggesting a process of adaptation to the presence of casinos in Missouri.
The second phase of the Harvard study, as reported in the article, 'One decade of self exclusion: Missouri casino self-excluders four to ten years after enrollment,' focused on the effectiveness of the MVEP by assessing the experiences of a sample of Missouri self-excluders for as long as 10 years after their initial enrollment in the program (Nelson, Kleschinsky, LaBrie, Kaplan, & Shaffer, 2010). According to this study, most of the self-excluders had positive experiences with MVEP and reduced their gambling and gambling problems after enrollment. However, half of the 15.9 percent of the self-excluders succeeded in trespassing at Missouri casinos after enrollment, indicating that the benefit of MVEP was attributable more to the act of enrollment than enforcement.
Dr. Robert Ladouceur and his colleagues at Laval University also have conducted extensive research on the effectiveness of self-exclusion. Their studies of a self-exclusion program in a Quebec casino demonstrated the promise of this approach for helping individuals reduce problem gambling behaviors (Ladouceur, Jacques, Giroux, Ferland, & Leblond, 2000; Ladouceur, Sylvain & Gosselin, 2007). Their most recent study (Tremblay, Boutin, & Ladouceur, 2008) is the first to evaluate efforts to make self-exclusion a therapeutic program (e.g., providing counseling support to enrollees) rather than just a legal agreement about trespassing. The authors observed major improvements in the study sample between the initial and final evaluation in terms of the amount of time and money they spent gambling, the consequences of their gambling, scores on the criteria for diagnosing pathological gambling and levels of psychological distress.
Such findings appear to support the notion of self-exclusion as a gateway to treatment. In their 2007 publication, Blaszczynski, Ladouceur, and Nower argued for a unifying structure for self-exclusion programs as a gateway to treatment based on a system operated by independent educators. These educators would inform individuals of the purpose of self-exclusion, establish links and access to supplementary services and monitor and report the effectiveness of the overall program.
Although these studies reveal the promise of self-exclusion, all identify the need for larger sample sizes in future research to determine more definitively the effectiveness of self-exclusion as an intervention for disordered gambling.
Despite this interest in self-exclusion as a therapeutic program or harm reduction strategy, self-exclusion programs administered by governments are technically considered legal agreements with penalties for self-excluders who violate the terms of the contract. For example, self-excluders can be arrested for trespassing or fined if caught on the premises of a casino in many jurisdictions. Self-exclusion has raised questions among legal specialists about the responsibility and liability of the gaming operator. Self-excluders have initiated lawsuits in cases where the casino did not enforce the ban (Faregh, & Leth-Steensen, 2009; Czegledy, 2009). Questions such as, 'Who is responsible if a self-excluded person gains entry to a casino and goes bankrupt?' and 'Should casinos withhold winnings from self-excluded patrons?' have been posed in several court cases (Rhea, 2005). Some also have questioned whether self-exclusion agreements even meet the legal standards of an enforceable legal contract (Napolitano, 2003).
Although most of the peer-reviewed research on self-exclusion is focused on the U.S. and Canada, studies on this intervention have been conducted all over the world. Both peer-reviewed and 'grey' literature (publications that are not peer-reviewed, such as government reports) indicate that self-exclusion has been studied in Australia, New Zealand, Switzerland, South Africa and the United Kingdom (Breen, 2005; Townshend, 2007; Haefeli, 2005; O'Neil, Whetton, Dolman, et al., 2003; Collins, & Kelly, 2002; Jackson, & Thomas, 2005).
If you are interested in learning more about self-exclusion research, note that two upcoming educational programs will focus on translating several of the studies cited above for a non-scientific audience. First, Dr. Robert Ladouceur will present his findings from the self-exclusion program in Quebec during the NCRG Webinar, 'Regulating Interventions for Disordered Gambling: What New Research Says about the Safety, Effectiveness and Logistics of Self-Exclusion Programs.'This free, one-hour webinar will be held onAug. 16, 2010, at 2 p.m. (EDT), and also will feature Kevin Mullally, J.D., general counsel and director of government affairs at Gaming Laboratories International,and the developer of Missouri Voluntary Exclusion Program. Advance registration is required.
Second, the next volume of the NCRG's publication series, Increasing the Odds: A Series Dedicated to Understanding Gambling Disorders, focuses on research about self-exclusion, providing summaries of several of the articles cited above, written for a non-scientific audience. This free publication will be available in October 2010.
ReferencesBlaszczynski, A., Ladouceur, R., & Nower, L. (2007). Self-exclusion: A proposed gateway to treatment model. International Gambling Studies, 7(1), 59-71.
Breen, H., Buultjens, J., & Hing, N. (2005). Evaluating implementation of a voluntary responsible gambling code in Queensland, Australia. International Journal of Mental Health & Addiction, 3(1), 15–25.
Collins, P. & Kelly, J. (2002). Problem Gambling and Self-Exclusion: A Report to the South African Responsible Gambling Trust. Gaming Law Review, 6(6), 517-531.
Revoke Casino Self Exclusion Singapore
Czegledy, P. (2009). The Legal Risk of Problem Gambling. Gaming Law Review and Economics, 13(3), 233-240.
Haefeli, J. (2005). Swiss experience with self-exclusion programs. Presented at the Niagara Falls Self Exclusion Panel, Niagara Falls. Retrieved from http://www.responsiblegambling.org/articles/jorg_hafeli_discovery_2005.pdf
Jackson, A., & Thomas, S. (2005). Clients' perspectives of, and experiences with, selected Australian problem gambling services. Journal of Gambling Issues, 14. Retrieved from http://jgi.camh.net/doi/full/10.4309/jgi.2005.14.7
LaBrie, R. A., Nelson, S. E., LaPlante, D. A., Peller, A. J., Caro, G., & Shaffer, H. J. (2007). Missouri casino self-excluders: distributions across time and space. Journal of Gambling Studies, 23(2), 231-243.
Ladouceur, R., Jacques, C., Giroux, I., Ferland, F., & Leblond, J. (2000). Analysis of a casino's self-exclusion program. Journal of Gambling Studies,16(4), 453-460.
Ladouceur, R., Sylvain, C., & Gosselin, P. (2007). Self-exclusion program: a longitudinal evaluation study. Journal of Gambling Studies, 23(1), 85-94.
Napolitano, F. (2003). The self-exclusion program: legal and clinical considerations. Journal of Gambling Studies,19(3), 303-315.
Nelson, S. E., Kleschinsky, J. H., LaBrie, R. A., Kaplan, S., & Shaffer, H. J. (2010). One decade of self exclusion: Missouri casino self-excluders four to ten years after enrollment. Journal of Gambling Studies,26(1), 129-144.
Nower, L., & Blaszczynski, A. (2006). Characteristics and gender differences among self-excluded casino problem gamblers: Missouri data. Journal of Gambling Studies,22(1), 81-99
Nower, L., & Blaszczynski, A. (2008). Characteristics of problem gamblers 56 years of age or older: a statewide study of casino self-excluders. Psychology and Aging, 23(3), 577-584.
Singapore Casino Self Exclusion Policy
O'Neil, M., Whetton, S., Dolman, B., Herbert, M., Giannopoulos, V., O'Neil, D., & Wordley, J. (2003). Evaluation of Self-exclusion Programs. South Australian Centre for Economic Studies. Retrieved from http://www.justice.vic.gov.au
Rhea, A. (2005). Voluntary Self Exclusion Lists: How They Work and Potential Problems. Gaming Law Review, 9(5), 462-469.
Suurvali, H., Hodgins, D.C., & Cunningham, J.A. (2010). Motivators for resolving or seeking help for gambling problems: A review of the empirical literature. Journal of Gambling Studies, 26, 1-33.
Singapore Casino Self Exclusion Rules
Townshend, P. (2007). Self-exclusion in a Public Health Environment: An Effective Treatment Option in New Zealand. International Journal of Mental Health and Addiction, 5(4), 390-395.
